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This paper describes two problems when testing the efficiency of intra-household allocations. 
First, using Monte Carlo simulations I show that the test proposed for efficiency in consumption 
has a high type-II error, leading to a false acceptance of the hypothesis. Second, I show it is 
possible that even under asymmetric information the hypothesis of efficiency, incorrectly, cannot 




                                                 
(*) I would like to thank Brain Gould for allowing me to use the Brazilian survey and Ragan Petrie, Michael 
Carter and Kenneth West for their comments. All errors are mine.   2
1.  Introduction 
How do households allocate resources among members? In recent years an increasing 
number of studies have tried to answer this question.
1 These studies depart from 
traditional models where a household is seen as making decisions as if it were one 
individual, the so-called unitary models. The empirical rejection of the unitary model (see 
Thomas, 1990 and Bourguignon et al., 1993, among others) motivated a shift toward 
models where household members interact to decide their outcomes. 
However, there is no agreement on the nature of the alternative bargaining model to 
study these interactions. Some papers suggest that household members behave as players 
in a Nash non-cooperative model in order to allocate resources (Jones, 1983) while others 
suggest a cooperative approach using a Nash bargaining solution (McElroy and Horney, 
1981). But what these new approaches have in common is that, independently of how the 
household decides to allocate resources, the outcome is assumed to be Pareto efficient. 
This efficiency in the allocation of resources rests on two assumptions: symmetric 
information and full commitment among members. In this paper I critique this efficiency 
by focusing the analysis on the first assumption. Symmetric information requires that all 
members have perfect information about the resources owned by the other members. For 
example, with a married couple the assumption of symmetric information requires that 
each spouse know exactly how much money their partner has, or at least that there is no 
cost in getting that information. Household members then cannot hide information, and 
all resources are taken into account in order to allocate them. However, as I will show 
later, it is reasonable to think that for each member the incentives to reveal information 
                                                 
1 See Doss (1996) for a survey of the literature.   3
about their own income decreases with the bargaining power of the other member(s). 
As it turns out, the empirical validation of the efficiency assumption is not clear. 
Table 1 shows the results of several studies that estimated this hypothesis. It is interesting 
to note that the hypothesis is rejected when applied to household production in low-
income economies but not in rich economies on the consumption/leisure side. I will argue 
later that this is the case because of the relatively small incentives to hide information on 
household production versus household consumption. For example, when applied to a 
French household survey, Bourguignon, Browning, Chiappori and Lechene (1993) show 
that, although the unitary model can be rejected, it is not possible to reject the hypothesis 
that intra-household allocations are efficient in the sense of Pareto. However, Udry 
(1994), using information from rural households in Burkina Faso, shows that, ceteris 
paribus, the intensity in the use of input factors is significantly smaller when the plot is 
cultivated by a woman versus by a man
2. This lack of robust evidence in favor of or 
against the Pareto efficiency hypothesis is the motivation for the present paper. 
Table 1
Empirical evidence for the hypothesis of efficienct intra-household allocation
Author Data Commodity Result
Jones (1983) Cameroon Production 
1/ Rejected
Bourguigon et al (1993) France Expenditure Accepted
Thomas and Chen (1993) Taiwan Expenditure Accepted
Udry (1994) Burkina Faso Production 
1/ Rejected
Chiappori et al (2002) USA Labor supply Accepted
1/ Household production  
The objective of this paper is to evaluate this hypothesis in the allocation of resources 
                                                 
2 There is some evidence suggesting that Udry’s results are sensitive to the specification of the model. See 
Blanchard (2000).   4
within households using information from a low-income country such as Brazil with 
micro level data of consumption of private goods. In this sense, this paper is closer to the 
approach developed by Bourguignon et al (1993). I took this approach, mostly, because 
Udry’s method to analyze household production requires detailed information on the 
quality of each plot in order to isolate the effect of gender differences in the control of the 
plot on factor intensity. This level of information is very difficult to find in datasets for 
other countries. 
In a recent paper Attanasio and Lechene (2002) criticize the use of income to evaluate 
the hypothesis of efficiency due to endogeneity problems. The problem is even bigger 
due to the presence of an important number of households with no consumption reported. 
As I discuss in section 3, these zeros are associated with infrequency of purchases (the 
survey period is shorter than the purchasing period) rather than tastes. I address the 
problem of endogeneity using a (efficient) GMM estimator. 
I found that the hypothesis of efficient intra-household allocations cannot be rejected 
for the Brazilian case. However, I discuss how the potential presence of asymmetric 
information could affect the collection of information in consumption-income surveys. I 
argue that it is possible that even under asymmetric information the hypothesis, 
incorrectly, cannot be rejected. I also examine the performance of the test using Monte 
Carlo simulations. I show that the type-II error of incorrectly accepting the test efficiency 
hypothesis is very large for this test, therefore putting into question the efficiency result. 
The rest of the paper is divided as follows. Section 2 describes a model where agents 
interact to allocate resources within the household, and I derive testable implications for 
the hypothesis of efficient allocations. The data used to test this hypothesis is described in   5
section 3 and the econometric methods in section 4. The results are shown in section 5 
and the Monte Carlo simulations are discussed in section 6. Finally, the main conclusions 
are summarized in section 7.  
2.  A collective model for household behavior 
In this section I present a model to describe the allocation of resources within a 
household. The only assumption is that these allocations are efficient without any further 
assumption about the decision process. I also derive testable implications from this 
model. 
There are many ways to model this interaction (Bourguignon et al (1993), Attanasio 
and Lechene (2002)). I present a simple model where there is no altruism in the utility 
function. This setup, however, does not change the implications of the model. Assume 
the household consists of two members A and B, and each has preferences over the set of 
J private consumption goods denoted q
A and q
B. These preferences can be characterized 




B). As in Bourguingon et al (1993, p. 142) I 
assume that the labor supply of both household members is fixed, either because of 
rationed labor markets or from some level of separability between leisure and 
consumption. An allocation (q
A, q
B) is said to be collectively rational if it is the solution 
of the following Pareto problem: 
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BA B up yyis the reservation utility of member B and y
A, y
B are individual non-
labor income. An alternative formulation for (1) is a two step approach. In the first stage   6



















In the second stage, given the redistribution, each member maximizes his/her own 
utility subject to their new income θ













The redistributed income also reflects the decision power of member A and B and 
from the first stage note that  ( , , )
ii A B p yy θθ = is a function of prices and non-labor 
income
3 and note that θ
B=Y-θ
A as defined in equation (2). The set of Marshallian 
demands derived from problem (3) are: 
(4)    (, , ) (, (, , ) ) (, (, , ) ) 1 , . .
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If for a particular good j we differentiate (4) with respect to y
A and y
B in turn and 














which turns out to be independent of j. The left hand side is a ratio of income effects and 
is observable when estimating a demand function from equations in (4). The right hand 
side is not observable but is independent of j. Therefore, if the Pareto efficiency 
hypothesis in the allocation of household resources is satisfied, then for any two different 
commodities i and j we should observe ηi = ηj. The testable implication derived from the 
                                                 
3 Chiappori et al (2002) includes other variables called distributional factors.   7
















for all j=2, 3,…,J. This is the test I will implement using information from Brazilian 
households. The survey is described in the next section. 
3.  The Brazilian household survey 
To estimate equations in (4) I use the 1995-96 Brazilian Pesquisa de Orçamentos 
Familiares (Survey of Family Budgets). This survey is a new version of the 1974-75 one 
used by Thomas (1990) and it was also designed to calculate the Brazilian Consumer 
Price Index. It contains detailed information on expenditures, as well as labor and non-
labor income, at household and individual levels. For this paper, I define non-labor 
income as all income generated by rents, profits, positive transfers, bequests and 
pensions. All monetary variables in this study are measured in Brazilian Reais at 
September 15, 1996 prices
4. 
The survey collects information of more than fifteen thousand households living in 
urban areas. I restrict our sample to households composed of couples without children 
yielding a total of 1224 observations because, as mentioned by Bourguignon et al 
“…children and the expenditure on them may be considered as public goods by both 
parents” (op. cit. p. 146)
5. Therefore, I consider in the analysis only the consumption of 
four private goods: men’s and women’s clothing, transportation and food
6. 
                                                 
4 The exchange rate at that time was 1.02 Brazilian Reais = 1 US$ 
5 These authors restrict the sample to observations where both members work. The results of this paper do 
not change if I follow this suggestion. 
6 Bourguignon et al used 9 commodities in their estimation while Attanasio and Lechene (2002) estimated 
an expenditure system for 8 commodities. The selection of these commodities is arbitrary; they only need 
to be private goods. Note that there is no requirement in the model described in section 2 for the 
commodities to add up to total expenditure or income.   8
The clothing expenses category reflects a period of purchases of 90 days before the 
survey. It excludes shoes and bags, mainly because the questionnaire does not separate 
these groups by gender. Transportation includes all expenses in the last 7 days and does 
not include traveling expenditures. The food category includes food consumption at home 
(for a period of seven days after the beginning of the survey) and away from home (last 7 
days) and does not include either alcohol or tobacco. 
Table 2 presents some basic statistics of the consumption of these 4 groups. The main 
feature shown there is the important percentage of households with no consumption for 
each commodity, although these commodities represent a broad category of goods. This 
would reflect more a problem of infrequency-of-purchase rather than tastes and 
preferences (i.e, a true corner solution). The problem of infrequency of purchases arises 
when the extent of the survey period is smaller that the purchase period. 
Table 2
Basic statistics of household expenditure
Share on total Percentage of
Variables expenditure (%) non-zeros Mean Std. Dev.
Men's clothing 3.1 54.8 331.9 426.5
Women's clothing 4.7 59.9 421.9 642.2
Transportation 16.6 76.7 1562.1 2022.2
Food 20.2 95.3 2118.6 2318.3
Note: Monetary variables are expressed in Brazilian Reals at September 15, 1996 prices. Exchange
rate: 1.02 Brazilian Reais = 1 US$
For positive values
 
For example, consider the case of food. Note that this is a very broad category, in 
comparison with, say, broccoli. As I mentioned, in the survey, households were asked to 
fill out a detailed diary of purchases for a period of seven days. If the household bought 
their food a few days before the survey it would probably not need to buy any food in 
more than a week. So the lack of food purchases would hardly reflect a desire not to   9
consume food at all, as could be the case for broccoli. Some people just do not like 
broccoli, which will represent a true corner solution due to tastes and preferences. It is 
therefore more plausible that the lack of information of food purchases reflects that the 
household did not need to buy any food during the survey period. This infrequency-of-
purchases problem would impose some restrictions in the choice of the econometric 
methods to estimate the system of expenditure. I will revisit this in section 4. 
Table 3
Main characteristics of household members
Variables Mean Std. Dev.
Women
Wage income 2782.4 6477.0
Non-labor income 1457.9 5863.3
Age 43.5 17.9
Years of schooling 7.9 4.7
Men
Wage income 7354.3 15381.3
Non-labor income 5655.1 15273.5
Age 47.2 18.4
Years of schooling 7.9 4.9
Age difference 3.7 8.0
Note: Monetary variables are expressed in Brazilian Reals at September 15,
1996 prices. Exchange rate: 1.02 Brazilian Reais = 1 US$
Statistics
 
To estimate the hypothesis of efficiency we need information on non-labor income 
for each member. Table 3 compares these variables for both men and women. Men not 
only have more labor income, on average, but also more non-labor income. However, the 
average education level is about the same. Finally, this table shows that women are 
married to older men, with an average age difference of 3.7 years. 
4.  Description of the econometric method 
In this section I describe the econometric method used to estimate the system of 
expenditures described in equation (4) and to test the hypothesis of efficient allocations 
expressed in (4). First, note that I say system of expenditures (or Engel curves) instead of   10
system of demands. The reason for this is the traditional assumption in cross section 
studies that all households face the same prices (Thomas, 1990). So the set equations in 
(4) are re-written as: 
(6)  (,) ((,) ) ( (,)
AB A B AAAB B AAB
jj j j j qyy q q g yy gY yy θθ =+= + −    j=1, 2,…, J 
As mentioned in section 3 the problem of infrequency-of-purchase restricts our 
choice of the econometric methods. In particular, as showed by Keen (1986) and Pudney 
(1989) the use of OLS to equation (6) produces inconsistent estimates. The authors 
discard also the use of a Tobit model because this assumes that the presence of zeros 
respond to more permanent reasons, such as a true corner solution generated by taste and 
preferences. As I argued before, the broad definition of our commodities makes more 
plausible the hypothesis of the infrequency-of-purchases rather that a true corner solution 
due to tastes in order to explain zero expenditure. 
Blundell and Meghir (1986) and Pudney (1989) proposed a Maximum Likelihood 
estimation of the probability that the household purchases commodity j within the survey 
period to estimate efficiently equation (6). This methodology requires the estimation of a 
“…very complicated distribution” of an unobservable true rate of consumption of good j. 
(Pudney, op cit. p.176). Clearly, this goes far beyond the objective of the paper, but 
fortunately there exists an easier alternative. 
Keen (1986) showed that for the particular case where the expenditure function is 
linear in income (or expenditure), the use of the instrumental variables (IV) applied to 
equation (6) will yield consistent estimates of the parameters when all the observations   11
(zeros and non-zeros) are used
7.  He also shows that efficiency could be improved in the 
case of over-identification of the parameters. Keen proposed the use of 3SLS. In this 
paper I will use instead a (efficient) GMM estimator because it will allow for efficient 
estimators even without knowing the form of the heteroskedasticity of the errors
8. 
To test the efficiency in the allocation of intra-household allocations I need to 
evaluate relations across equations: the ratio of income effects has to be the same in each 
equation as shown in (4). This requires the joint estimation of each expenditure function. 
Hence I will estimate the set of equations (6) using a multi-equation GMM (see Hayashi, 
2001).  
I will therefore proceed as follows: First, I will test the over-identification of the 
model using the J-statistic (or Hansen test). If I cannot reject the null hypothesis of 
correct identification, then I will test for the linearity of Engel curves. To test this 
hypothesis I will use the Distance-statistic (or Newey-West test)
9. If I cannot reject the 
hypothesis that the parameters of the nonlinear income terms are zero, then the conditions 
shown by Keen for a consistent and efficient estimation of Engel curves will be satisfied. 
Finally, I use the Distance-statistic to test the nonlinear set of hypothesis described in (5). 
If I cannot reject those restrictions, then the implications of the collective model will be 
satisfied so I will accept (or not be able to reject) the hypothesis of efficiency in the 
                                                 
7 The motivation for IV methods comes from the presence of measurement errors. These errors appear 
because of the need to satisfy the adding-up conditions. This could probably make the reader think that it is 
important to have a full system of expenditures. But this is not necessarily true. The model described in 
section 2 requires only private goods, so housing and utilities, for example, cannot be part of the estimation. 
8 As mentioned by Pudney, the drawback of Keen’s method is that the predicted valued of the expenditures 
could be negative. Instead, Pudney proposed a nonlinear estimation. He suggested the use of a cdf log-
normal function. This method, however, will not permit a complete identification of the parameters. In 
particular, the variance of the errors is assumed to be constant and equal to, say, one. Since the purpose of 
the paper is not on the prediction of expenditure I will assume the problem of negativity to be less 
important than the heteroskdasticity one. 
9 As shown in Hayashi (2001) the relevant number of observation is not N but NxJ, where J is the number 
of commodities estimated.   12
allocation of resources within Brazilian urban households. Otherwise, I reject the 
hypothesis of Pareto efficiency. 
In particular I will use the following parametric expression for the j-th Engel curve 
and the i-th observation: 
(7) 
AB
ji i j jA jB ji qz y ye ϕβ β =+ + +    for j=1, 2, …, J and i=1,2,…,N 
where zi includes a constant and a set of demographic characteristics of the members 
(education and age), y
A and y
B
 are non-labor income of member A and B respectively, φj, 
βjA and βjB are parameters to be estimated, eji is the error term and N is the number of 
observations. The set of restrictions in (5) are expressed as:  111 A Bj A j Bj η ββ ββ η = ==  
or equivalently: 
(8)  11 0 Aj B Bj A β ββ β −=  for j=2, 3, …, J. 
This is the expression I will finally use to evaluate the hypothesis of efficiency; 
however for ease of understanding I will still call it ratio of income effects. The results of 
estimating the set of equations (7) and testing (8) using the Brazilian data are presented in 
the following section. 
5.  Are intra-households allocations in Brazil efficient? 
Here I present the results of estimating a set of Engel curves for childless couples in 
urban Brazil. I use a multi-equation GMM estimator. I try two sets of instruments. In both 
cases I use a second order polynomial in age and education for male and females. The 
differences in the set of instruments reside in the choice of regional-level variables added. 
I first include 10 dummy variables because the survey is divided into 11 metropolitan   13
regions
10. However, I reject the hypothesis of correct specification using the J-statistic. I 
then use a set of variables to capture more variability among regions. I replace the 10 
dummies with 5 regional-level variables such as GDP per-capita, unemployment rate for 
male and female, size of urban population and sex ratio
11. In Table 4, the J-statistic -using 
these second set of instruments- is 26.4 which is smaller than χ
2
95% (20) = 31.4. Then I 
cannot reject the hypothesis of correct specification of equations in (7). 
I then test the linearity of the Engel curves. I assume that the nonlinearity in income 
of the Engel curves can be characterized using the following functional form: 
22 () () ( )
AB A B A B
ji i j jA jB jA jB j ji qz y y y y y ye ϕβ β δ δ ψ =+ + + + + +  
for j=1, 2, …, J and i=1,2,…,N. The test shows that I cannot reject H0: δjA=δjB=ψj=0 for 
all j=1, 2,…,4. The D-statistic is 3.3 which is smaller that χ
2
95% (12) = 21. Then, the 
Engel curves are linear in income and therefore satisfy the conditions for consistency and 
efficiency shown by Keen (1986). 
I now present the results of the joint GMM estimation of Engel curves in Table 4. The 
non-labor income variables appear to be positive and significant for most of the 
commodities. These results are different from Bourguignon et al (1993) where income 
variables are mostly non-significant. Part of the explanation for the differences could be 
found in the method used. They use an OLS estimation for the Engel curves which as 
shown by Keen produces inconsistent and inefficient estimates
12. 
                                                 
10 These 11 regions are: Rio de Janeiro, Porto Alegre, Belo Horizonte, Recife, São Paulo, Brasilia - Distrito 
Federal, Belém, Fortaleza, Salvador, Curitiba and Goiânia. 
11 Sex ratio is defined as the number of women divided by the number of men in urban areas. This is a more 
aggregate definition of the one used in Chiappori et al (2002) to estimate labor supply. 
12 The authors claim that their estimation is not different when they used the ML approach suggested by 
Blundell and Meghir (1986).   14
 
Our parameters of interest are the ratio of income effects across equations. Women’s 
income seems to have a bigger impact on expenditure that men’s income. A point 
estimate of this ratio for food is 2.3 similar to the ratio for transportation. I then evaluate 
the hypothesis of efficiency of intra-household allocations using the Distance-statistic. 
The test requires J-1 restrictions on the parameters. The actual value of the test is 1.2 
which is smaller than the critical value χ
2
95%(3) = 7.8. This evidence does not allow us to 
reject the null hypothesis that the income effects are equal in all equations. The testable 
implication of the collective model described in section 2 cannot be rejected by the data. 
These results are similar to the ones presented in Table 1. It suggests that, at least for 
Table 4 
GMM estimation of household expenditures by commodities
Men's Women's Transp-
Variables  clothing clothing tation Food 
Constant  4.967 6.282 21.421 26.780 
(2.318) (3.016) (12.809) (16.316) 
Men's age  -0.061 -0.045 0.088 -0.012 
(0.077) (0.097) (0.433) (0.483) 
Women's age  0.001 -0.106 0.200 0.197 
(0.083) (0.105) (0.464) (0.519) 
Men's age squared  1/  -0.002 0.001 -0.065 -0.028 
(0.007) (0.009) (0.043) (0.044) 
Women's age squared  1/  -0.003 0.006 -0.050 -0.061 
(0.008) (0.010) (0.048) (0.052) 
Men's years of schooling  -0.035 -0.013 -0.528 -0.596 
(0.094) (0.119) (0.525) (0.665) 
Women's years of schooling  -0.096 -0.003 -0.893 -0.593 
(0.099) (0.139) (0.556) (0.717) 
Men's non-labor income  0.020 0.008 0.186 0.177 
(0.014) (0.018) (0.079) (0.098) 
Women's non-labor income  0.055 0.082 0.432 0.410 
(0.033) (0.051) (0.196) (0.227) 
Number of observations  1224
J-statistic  26.38
χ 
2  (20)  31.41
1/ Parameters are multiplied by 10
Notes: Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. Instruments: a constant, a second order 
polynomial in age and education (male and female) and 5 regional variables: population, 
GDP per-capita, sex ratio, female and male unemployment
Commodities
       15
urban households, regarding the consumption of goods, the intra-household allocations 
follow the patterns described by efficient outcomes. 
Does this mean then that each member has truthfully revealed their income? Consider 
the following examples. First, suppose a household member received an inheritance from 
her family. If the bargaining power of her partner is very high most of the money she 
received will end up being used by her partner. In this case she will not have any 
incentive to reveal the existence of the inheritance or, if this is not possible, she will 
declare an amount as an inverse function of her partner’s bargaining power. 
Second, suppose one of the household members is having an extramarital affair. 
Would this person have incentives to reveal all of his/her income sources? Most probably 
not. If he/she did so, his/her partner could easily ask about the missing income, leading 
the person to lie and be pressured to show goods that reflect the missing income. Here, 
the lack of incentives is independent of the bargaining power but not, of course, of the 
amount of money spent on goods related to the affair. 
This fact could play an important role if adultery is quite common. Anthropological 
studies describe adultery as the main reason for divorce in South American cultures 
(Betzig, 1989). A study of sexual conduct in the city of São Paulo reveals that the average 
number of sexual partners that married men have in a year is 1.45. This is equivalent to 
saying that half of married men are monogamous and the other half are not
13. 
The examples and the anthropological studies suggest that household members could 
have incentives to lie and hide information from their partners and in a survey. For 
instance, in the Brazilian survey used in this paper the questionnaire is filled in most 
                                                 
13 See Child (1999 p. 207).   16
cases when both members are present
14. Therefore all the reported income in a survey 
would be equal to the total income the household actually uses to allocate among 
members; that is, there would be no income lost because all the reported income is used. 
But the information about the true income is kept private. In this case scenario it is very 
possible that the test for efficiency in the intra-household allocation could not be rejected.  
One way to model the asymmetry of information departs from the problem stated 
in equation (1), by assuming the existence of goods purchased by member A and that are 
not revealed to member B. This could occur because the incentive for a household 
member to reveal his/her true income decreases with his/her bargaining power, as I 
mentioned before. Let c
A be the consumption of good c that is hidden by member A and 




and under the assumption of separability of q
A and c
A I can solve (9) in two stages 




A is the revealed income and y
A is the true income which is observable only 
when m
A=y
A, if so, member A does not hide income. Note that the second stage has the 
same structure as equation (1). Hence, we cannot reject the hypothesis of efficiency even 
                                                 
14 Instituto Brasileiro de Geógrafia e Estatística (1997) 
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when the revealed income is different from the true one, because the test derived from the 
second stage is not able to discriminate between the true and the revealed income. 
Now, the solution of the first stage implies: m
A*=m(pc , y
A). If member A hides 
income from member B then the revealed income (m
A*)  is correlated with prices pc. 








c mp e αλ =+ +  
will showλ =0. I reject the null hypothesis if 0 λ ≠ and then the behavior of member A is 
compatible with (9). These are testable implications. The problem is to find which prices 
could be included in pc, Once these prices are identified I can estimate equation (10) 
using the urban Brazilian sample to test if one member hides income. This is part of my 
future research
16. 
The fact that household members have incentives to hide income from both their 
partners and the surveys could be the reason why the hypothesis of efficient allocations is 
not rejected in consumption studies but is in household production. In the latter case the 
test is to evaluate, for example, whether crop yields differ when controlled by men or 
women of the same household in the same year. Udry (1994) shows that households can 
increase total production if they reallocate their labor and inputs (fertilizers). In this case, 
as well as in Jones (1983), the variables used in the analysis are less affected by 
asymmetric information. It is clear that it is physically more difficult to hide production. 
Also, if the household sells their production in the market, there arises a need for the 
                                                 
15 The variable e is an orthogonal error term. 
16 Another alternative could be to compare the consumption behavior of singles and married individuals 
with similar characteristics as a way to estimate possible biases in the report of income   18
goods to be transported. This is usually more costly if done separately by men and 
women, so the chances to hide revenues are lower. 
In the next section I take a different, but complementary, approach to evaluate the 
way the efficiency of intra-household allocation of consumption goods is tested. I explore 
the performance of the test using Monte Carlo simulations; in particular I look at the 
type-II error of the test. A high type-II error would imply an incorrect acceptance of a 
false hypothesis. 
6.  A Monte Carlo experiment 
In this section I present a Monte Carlo simulation to evaluate the performance of the 
Distance-statistic in order to test the hypothesis of efficient intra-household allocations 
described in (7). Let me start by defining the model. I will generate artificial data 
satisfying the following properties: 
(11)  
() 0












for  i=1,2,…,N and j=1,2,...,J; where qji represents expenditure on commodity j by 
household i, yi=[1 yi
A yi
B] represents members’ A and B non-labor income, xi is a Lx1 
vector of truly exogenous variables (including a constant), βj=[αj βj1  βj2] and γj are 
conformable vectors of parameters to be estimated and eji and uji  are iid normal errors. 
This model describes a problem of endogeneity of the yi’s variables so I use xi as 
instruments. As in previous sections, the parameters of interest are the ratio of income 
effects β11/β12 and β21/β22.   19
For the simulations I assume that J = 2, N = 1224 as in our Brazilian sample and L=6. 
The xi variables are a constant and L-1 draws from a uniform distribution. The parameters 
γj are collected in matrix Γ computed as:  
0.3 1.8 0.01 0.7 0.24 0.9
0.6 0.79 0.02 0.5 0.56 0.1
2.0 2.5 1.0 1.6 3.0 4.0
− 
 ′ Γ= − 
 
 
The error terms eij and uij are drawn from independent standardized normal 
distributions. The variables yi and qji are generated as described in (8). I set the intercepts 
α1=3.0 and α2=2.5 and the income effects as β21=0.178,  β22=0.41 and β11=0.02, 
replicating, respectively, the parameters obtained for food and men’s clothing 
expenditure in Table 4. Τhen, the ratio of income effects (β21/β22) for commodity 2 (food) 
is η2=0.43 and will remain fixed in all the simulations. 
I allow β12 to vary in order to evaluate different alternatives of the true parameters. I 
start by setting β12  =0.046 so η1 = η2 = 0.43. For each value of β12 I calculate the true 
ratio of income effects for equation 1 (η1), the percentage difference between the two 
ratios:  12 ( 1)*100 η η −  and the percentage of 10,000 replications in which the Distance-
statistic exceeds the χ
2
95%(1) level, where the parameters α’s and β’s are estimated by 
multi-equation (efficient) GMM method
17. These results are reported in Table 5. 
When the two ratios are equal (row 1 in Table 5), the percentage of rejections is close 
to the theoretical levels, suggesting a very low type-I error (i.e. rejecting a true 
hypothesis). However, as we move away from the equality of income effects, the 
rejections of the null hypothesis do not increase rapidly enough. For example, when the 
                                                 
17 As expected, in any of the simulation, I could not reject the null hypothesis of correct specification using 
the J-statistic (Hansen test).   20
differences between η1 and η2 is 5% (row 2) the rejection of the null hypothesis of 
efficient allocations is around 4% but when one ratio is 5 times the second one (row 8), 
the rejection of Ho is still small: only 4.2% of the time. This could be taken as an 
indication that the type-II error, accepting a false hypothesis, is high for this test. 
Therefore, the results I obtained in the last section would be incorrect: I could be wrongly 
accepting the hypothesis of efficient allocation when we should be rejecting it. 
Table 5
Monte Carlo simulations for the rejection of the hypothesis of efficient intra-household allocations
Rejections of  the 
hypothesis of efficient
Simulations β12 Equation 1 (η1) Equation 2 (η2) allocations (%)
(1)   Equal ratios: 0.046 0.432 0.432 3.79
       Different ratios:
(2)    5% 0.044 0.453 0.432 3.92
(3)    25% 0.037 0.540 0.432 3.78
(4)    50% 0.031 0.648 0.432 3.86
(5)    75% 0.026 0.755 0.432 3.71
(6)    2 times 0.023 0.863 0.432 3.77
(7)    3 times 0.015 1.295 0.432 4.09
(8)    5 times 0.009 2.159 0.432 4.17
(9)    10 times 0.005 4.317 0.432 4.22
Note: Table shows percentage of 10,000 replications of a sample size equal to the actual sample (1224 obs) in which
the Distance statistic exceeds the χ
2




Finally, I should make clear that these simulations, although very illustrative, are by 
no means conclusive. However, this evidence definitively suggests further research on 
the performance of the test in order to avoid wrong inferences. 
7.  Conclusions 
Recent studies of household decisions moved away from models where the household 
is seen as a monolithic entity toward models where household members interact to 
allocate resources. These new approaches vary in the way they model these interactions, 
but all assumed that the outcome is efficient: that is, all resources are used. In this paper I   21
study whether or not the intra-household allocation of resources is efficient and point out 
some flaws in the way this hypothesis has been tested in the allocation of private 
consumption goods. 
I followed the literature and applied the test to an urban Brazilian survey, estimating 
Engel curves for broad good categories. In the estimation I consider the criticism of 
endogeneity of income or total expenditure and the fact that many households report no 
consumption due to the infrequency-of-purchase problem. I address these two problems 
using GMM methods that allow us to get consistent and efficient estimates of the 
parameters of interest. As in the rest of the literature, I could not find evidence to reject 
the hypothesis of efficient allocations of consumption goods. 
However, this assumption of efficiency requires both asymmetric information and full 
commitment among members. I focused here on the former and showed that when the 
bargaining power of one member is high his/her partner has incentives to hide her own 
income sources. Also, if one of the members has an extramarital affair, as the 
anthropological evidence shows for the Brazilian case, the incentive to hide income 
sources persists independently of the bargaining power of the other member, affecting 
therefore the reports in surveys. I also claimed that these incentives are smaller in 
household production. Finally, I carried out Monte Carlo experiments to evaluate the 
performance of the test suggested by the literature. I showed that the type-II of the 
econometric test is high, so the actual methodology tends to incorrectly accept a false 
hypothesis of efficient allocations. These issues motivate future research to find better 
ways to evaluate this hypothesis. 
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